预告 | 【学术报告会】陈学政:A Theory of Symbiotic Corruption(共生性腐败理论)

 

主讲人简介

       陈学政,江西财经大学经济学院副教授,硕士生导师,学科领军(理论经济学)。2013年毕业于英国华威大学(the University of Warwick)经济系。曾在《经济研究》,Technological and Economic Development of Economy等国内外权威期刊发表多篇文章。担任《经济研究》;International Political Science Review;Armed Force and Society等国内外权威期刊和Routledge / Taylor & Francis出版社的匿名审稿人。


内容简介

      Symbiotic corruption occurs when government officials establish a symbiotic relationship among the members of a political faction and engage in corrupt activities collectively and cooperatively in pursuit of political power and rents. It prevails in weakly institutionalized societies and has four primary features: symbiotic, collective, hierarchical, and factionalized. In this study, we introduce a formal theoretical framework for analyzing the features, mechanics, and consequences of symbiotic corruption. Our framework formalizes the competition for political rents among government officials both within a political faction and between factions in a weakly institutionalized society.

      We show that when anti-corruption punishment is sufficiently severe, rival factions are induced to reach a tacit collusion in maintaining peace, resulting in a state of “balance of terror” in the political contest and leading to universal symbiotic corruption within a regime. An increase in anti-corruption punishment may reduce corruption if and only if it raises the deterrence effect of anti-corruption law enforcement without triggering the balance effect. Under certain conditions, enhancing the monitoring efficiency of corruption merely transforms nonsymbiotic corruption into symbiotic corruption, without affecting the overall scale of corruption. Similarly, increasing legal income may reduce corruption if it does not induce rival factions to reach a tacit collusion in maintaining peace, and it will become completely ineffective in combating corruption in the presence of such a collusion. This study sheds light on the emergence, prevalence, and persistence of systemic corruption in weakly institutionalized societies.